In this paper, abrupt and large changes in volatility of financial variables representing dynamics of the US financial sector are modeled with a joint regimeswitching process, distinguishing "low" and "high" volatility regimes. I find that the joint "high" volatility regime for the TED spread, return on the NYSE index, and capital-weighted CDS spread for large banks is closely related to periods of financial stress. This result suggests that the probability of the joint high volatility regime of these financial variables can be considered as a measure of systemic financial stress. (JEL C32, G01, G12)
Introduction
Recently, numerous studies analyze causes and propagation mechanisms of systemic risk. At the same time, systemic risk remains to be a not well defined concept. In general, systemic risk is perceived as the risk of a negative shock, severely affecting the entire financial system and the real economy. This shock can have different causes and triggers, such as a macroeconomic shock, a shock from the failure of an individual market participant affecting the entire system due to tight interconnections in the system, or a shock caused by information disruption in financial markets. Given the various causes of systemic shocks, there are also different approaches to define and measure systemic risk.
In this paper, I narrow down the definition of systemic risk to systemic financial stress. Systemic financial stress is a condition of financial markets when market participants experience increased uncertainty or change expectations about future financial losses, fundamental value of assets, and economic activity.
1 It is empirically observed that the behavior of financial variables during financial stress periods is different from calm periods. In particular, it is common that systemic shocks can cause abrupt and large changes in financial variables and can propagate systemic financial stress in the entire economy. Therefore, the volatility dynamic of financial markets is one of the important indicators of impact of shocks on the financial sector that can cause systemic financial stress.
In this study, I propose a regime-switching model that captures abrupt and large changes in volatility of financial variables by a joint Markov-switching process as an approach to measuring systemic financial stress. To do so, I extend the univariate SWARCH model, proposed in Hamilton and Susmel (1994) to a multivariate version. I use this multivariate SWARCH model to jointly describe volatility changes in financial variables representing the US financial markets, such as the TED spread, the return on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Index, and the CDS spreads of large banks. The TED spread, defined as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month Treasury yield, is a measure of short-term credit risk in the banking sector. Other studies, such as Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010) , also find the information in the TED spread useful for constricting their financial stress and financial condition indices. The return on the NYSE index is a measure of equity market dynamics. Estrella and Mishkin (1998) find that stock market performance is a useful recession predictor. The CDS spread is commonly used as a measure of default risk in the banking sector. For example, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) use information in CDS spreads to construct their measure of banking stability.
In my multivariate model, the volatility regime-switching process describes the changes between "low" and "high" volatility regimes, which are assumed to be common for all considered financial variables. Presumably, this joint regime-switching process would capture large shocks to financial variables which are common for financial variables and may have a systemic implication.
I find that the joint high volatility regime is closely related to financial stress periods in the considered sample of data. For example, the regime-switching process switches to the high volatility regime indicating stressful events, such as the 9-11 shock, the beginning of the "credit crunch" and subprime mortgage crisis in Hamilton and Susmel (1994) , I use data at the weekly frequency, in contrast to the daily data of a different set of financial variables used in González-Hermosillo and Hesse (2009) . This allows my model to reduce the effects of the "noise" in high-frequency data on the identification of regimes. Second, I
model the TED and CDS spreads in levels, which is a common approach to modeling interest rates in macro-finance literature (e.g., Ang and Piazzesi (2003) ; Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) ; Diebold and Li (2006); and Rudebusch and Wu (2008) ). This is contrast
to González-Hermosillo and Hesse (2009) , who model data in first differences. My result suggests that weekly data of the considered variables in levels produce more persistent regimes than daily data.
In this paper, systemic financial stress is measured using financial markets' volatility changes. Given a potentially wide-range of causes of financial stress, this approach should be considered as a complement to other methods of measuring systemic financial stress. Many empirical studies of financial stability propose financial stress indices constructed using a combination of several financial market variables, structural variables, balance sheet data, and aggregate banking sector characteristics. The choice of variables in these studies depends on their definition of stress. For example, Vila (2000) proposes measures of banking and equity stress for the US using falling bank equity prices, aggregate deposit growth, and the degree of decline in the stock market index.
Hanschel and Monnin (2005) derive a stress index for the Swiss banking system using market price data, balance sheet data, supervisory data, and other structural variables.
Similarly, Illing and Liu (2006) propose an index to measure overall financial stress for Canada, combining several variables for different markets into a single index. Numerous papers propose empirical methods to measure financial stress in developing countries;
however, as discussed in Illing and Liu (2006) , they are not performing well for developed countries. There are also many broader financial condition indices (FCIs), usually constructed using a weighted-sum or a principal-components approaches. Among wellknown financial condition indices are: the Bloomberg FCI, the City FCI, the Deutsche Bank FCI, the Godman Sachs FCI, the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index, the Macroeconomic Advisers Monetary and Financial Condition Index, and the OECD FCI. In general, given that measures of financial stress in these approaches depend on the choice of specific criteria and the methods of the combination of financial variables, performance of these financial indices is sensitive to causes of stress.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Model
It is common during periods of system-wide financial stress for all financial variables to experience large financial shocks and become highly volatile. Therefore, I assume that these periods of systemic stress are common for all variables and can be captured by a joint regime-switching process. I follow Hamilton and Susmel (1994) and describe volatility of financial variables by the regime-switching autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (SWARCH) specification:
where y i t denotes a financial variable i and s t denotes a volatility regime. In this specification, abrupt and large changes in volatilities of financial variables and their means are governed by an exogenous unobservable two-state first-order Markovswitching process s t with a transition probability matrix:
where p jk ≡ P r[s t = k|s t−1 = j]. The model assumes that agents observe realizations of regimes up to time t; however, econometricians have to estimate the entire path of s t
given data and the model.
The model is flexible for incorporating any number of regimes. For example, Hamilton and Susmel (1994) consider more than two regimes to model strong outliers such as the October 1987 stock market crush, separately from other large shocks. However, given the objective of this study to identify periods of systemic stress, the two-regime process is easier to interpret, and as it is shown in the Empirical Results section that the two-regime process is well identified for the considered sample of weekly data. for all i, and therefore the two regimes are labeled as the "low" and the "high" volatility regimes.
While the regime process captures large and common changes in volatility, small and gradual changes in volatility of each financial variable within each regime are modeled by the independent ARCH process described by equations (2) and (3). Similar to Hamilton and Susmel (1994) , who show that two lags are sufficient to model heteroskedasticity of weekly stock returns within regimes, I include two lags in equation (2).
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For identification purposes, parameters a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 in equation (3) are restricted to be positive to ensure positiveness of h 2 t for all sizes of shocks. In addition, these parameters are restricted to values less than unity to ensure stationarity of the process in equation (3). Similarly, parameters g st and h t in equations (1) and (2) are restricted to be positive as they represent the scaling of standard deviations. To identify g st and the parameters in equation (3), g st=1 is normalized to one. Also, parameter φ is restricted to be less than unity in absolute value, assuming that the AR(1) process in equation (1) is a stationary process. I estimate the model parameters, including unobserved regimes, using the method to evaluate the likelihood function for regimeswitching models developed in Hamilton (1989) .
Data
For my analysis, I construct the panel of weekly time-series data on the TED spread, the value-weighted return on the stock market, and the capital-weighted credit default swap (CDS) spread for selected large banks. The raw data for all time-series are at the daily frequency. This daily data is transformed into the weekly frequency using the data on Wednesday of each week. I choose Wednesday because the data on this day of the week is the most available among all days of a week for the considered sample of daily data. If the data on particular Wednesday is not available, the data on the day closest to Wednesday of that week is used. The choice of using weekly data is explained by a better identification of regimes due to less "noise" in the financial data at weekly frequency compared to daily data. The TED spread, defined as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR minus the 3-month Treasury yield, is a measure of short-term credit risk in the banking sector. The TED spread is constructed using the data for the 3-month Treasury yield of constant maturity series from St. Louis FRED and the 3-month LIBOR from Bloomberg.
The time-series of the stock market returns, which characterizes the price dynamics of the equity market, is constructed using the value-weighted NYSE index obtained from the CRSP. The market stock returns are continuous growth rates of the stock index from Wednesday to Wednesday, transformed into daily returns. 4 To check the robustness of my results, I estimated the model using normalized data by subtracting sample averages and dividing by sample standard deviations to avoid potential effects of scaling of data on the identification of regimes. The estimation results based on the two data approaches (i.e. normalized and not) are very close to each other. I choose to report the results for the non-normalized data.
The capital-weighted banks' CDS spread, constructed using CDS spreads of selected 
Results

I begin presenting my results with the analysis of key parameter estimates for the model
and then I analyze the identified regimes. Table 1 reports parameter estimates for the model described in equations (1), (2), and (3). The point estimates of parameter g i 2 for all considered financial variables are substantially larger than g i 1 , which is normalized to one. This result suggests that the volatility of the financial variables in the high volatility regime is considerably higher than in the low volatility regime, indicating that the regime-switching process indeed captures large changes in volatility. Consistent with the notion of requiring a risk premium for increased risk during stressful periods by financial markets, the estimates of intercept term µ i st for the TED and CDS spreads in the high volatility regime are considerably greater than in the low volatility regime.
In contrast, the point estimate of the intercept parameter for the stock index return in the high volatility regime is lower than in the low volatility regime. This result can be explained by the fact that the model captures the mean of realized returns rather than the expected return, which one theoretically should expect to increase with an increase in risk. The negative relationship between a stock volatility and return is also reported in other studies (e.g., Campbell (1987) ; Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989); and Whitelaw (1994) ). To check the effect of the regime-switching means on the identification of the regimes, I also estimate the model with constant intercept terms. The results are robust to both specifications of the model, suggesting that the regimes are mainly identified by changes in volatility. However, the likelihood ratio test rejects constant means with a p-value of 0.0001, suggesting that the model with the regime-switching intercept has a better fit. Therefore, for my analysis, I use the model specification with the regime-switching intercept terms. The notations of reported parameters correspond to equations (1), (3), and (4). Standard errors of estimated parameters are reported in parentheses.
The estimates of the ARCH terms a Figure 1 displays the probability of the joint high volatility regime from the multivariate SWARCH model. The graph suggests that the Figure 1 : TED spread, Return on NYSE index, CDS spread and "high" volatility regimes
Graphs (1), (2), and (3) display the time series of the data together with probabilities of "high" volatility regimes from their respective univariate SWARCH models. Graph (4) displays the probabilities of the joint "high" volatility regime from the multivariate SWARCH model. Shaded areas correspond to NBER recession dates. The numbers with arrows indicate specific stressful events: 1 -September-11; 2 -beginning of "credit crunch" and subprime crisis; 3 -Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
joint regime indicates the common systemic stressful periods listed earlier in my analysis. 
Conclusion
In this study, I propose a multivariate regime-switching model as a potential way of measuring systemic financial stress. In particular, I model large and abrupt volatility changes of financial variables such as the TED spread, the market stock return, and the CDS spread of large banks by the joint volatility regime-switching process, which is common for all financial variables. My results suggest that the probability of the joint "high" volatility regime captures stressful episodes in the considered sample of data reasonably well. At the same time, given a potentially wide-range of causes of systemic shocks, I propose this model as a complement to other approaches, which can provide insights to causes of systemic shocks.
